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The Protection of Public Officials: A Democratic Imperative
Executive Protection Training, Defending Democracy Initiative 9/5/2024
“Do you feel safe? You shouldn’t,”
“Your security detail is far too thin and incompetent to protect you. This world is unpredictable these days….anything can happen to anyone.”
Travis Ford of Nebraska in his threats to a local election official.
The Independent Security Advisors Defending Democracy program has published over seventeen articles since 2017 on the threats to public officials, and the need to protect these officials as a means to protect our democratic process as a whole.
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Dept of Homeland Security, The Bridging Divides Initiative (BDI), the Brennan Center for Justice, the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) a collaboration by the NCTC, DHS, and FBI, and the Justice Department’s Election Threats Task Force have all published dozens of reports, studies, polls, and warnings about the threats to public officials and the dangers to our democratic system.
Yet, here we are in the aftermath of the July 13th shooting of a former president still calling out from the dark asking for funding, legislation, and some semblance of recognition of the threats to our state and local officials.
But We Are Not Alone; Other Voices
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
In 2024 The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published the study “Rising Threats to Public Officials: A Review of 10 Years of Federal Data” The authors point out that the Department of Justice found an increase in “threats targeting education officials such as school board members, administrators, and faculty”. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/rising-threats-to-public-officials-a-review-of-10-years-of-federal-data/
That’s the good news, validation from another source of the threats to public officials. This was in 2024, nine years after our first article calling for the increased protection of local and state public officials.
Unfortunately in the report, they also note “There is a tendency among some observers to focus on threats as a ‘nuisance’ primarily initiated by individuals ‘blowing off steam,’ who will likely never act on their threats”.
“But who are these “observers” that in today’s political climate, they think these threats are just “individuals ‘blowing off steam.” We no longer have the luxury of just sitting back and “observing”, because if recent history has taught us anything, it’s that our threats are not just blowing off steam.”
Matthew Parker CEO, ISA
Troubling Signs
The following quotes from one of the co-authors of the CTC report are of greater interest to us than the information and data you will find in the report itself. Chapman University’s Peter Simi, co-author of the CTC report and a sociology professor at Chapman University
https://news.chapman.edu/2024/06/07/steady-rise-in-threats-against-public-officials-while-confidence-in-democracy-declines/
“Declining levels of confidence”
“The threats we’re tracking reflect declining levels of confidence in some of our most important social institutions and growing political divisions across society,”
For this article, we break this quote down into two parts. One we look at the loss of confidence in our social institutions, and the other, is the growing political divisions.
As we lose confidence in the institutions we once respected and trusted there will be those who turn to others and organizations with the same groupthink, the same bias, anger, and dissent. This shared anger feeds on itself, it grows beyond simple frustration or a shared bias. This anger over policy can become a directed anger towards a perceived “enemy of the state.”
Anger of this type is emotionally driven and may lead to an emotional frenzy where a person, or group of people become intellectually compromised by their emotions. They start to use phrases about their political opponent like he/she is “destroying our country”, “they hate America”, and “we must stop our enemies.” Forgetting these “enemies” are just fellow Americans with a different view about a policy or philosophy.
In the 2024 The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point study they spent a considerable amount of time and effort to determine “the proportion of threats to public officials that involve an ideological motivation.” In short, the emotional justifications for the threats against officials. We strongly recommend anyone in the executive protection private sector or law enforcement read this study if they are responsible for protecting a public official. The link is above.
Emotional Decision Making = Ideological Grievances
Since 2011 ISA instructors have used the phrase emotional decision-making to explain how a normally intelligent person could consider and then carry out threats against public officials. We have referred to the topic or motivation behind the emotion as a trigger, for example, the 2nd amendment and the perception of losing one’s right to own a gun or the right to or banning abortion.
The most emotionally affected may turn to violence, overriding their intellect which would normally prevent them from acting out of character.
The CTC in their study looked at federal cases where a defendant “expressed ideological grievances”, which we see as those triggers, and they reported 45% of those accused of making or carrying out a threat displayed “ideological motivation”.
What is concerning to us in the executive protection and law enforcement community is they found the numbers of emotionally based or “ideologically motivated” cases growing from 24% in 2013 to a high of 58% in 2021 after the election cycle. From 2013-2022 “ideologically motivated threats” against public officials consistently increased.
How these threats break down by ‘trigger points” is predictable, 43% were anti-government, anti-authority violent extremists. One example given in the study was of a Maryland, resident in 2016 threatening to kill President Obama and multiple members of Congress because of “government corruption out of control” and “treason against America” by officials who “sold out America.”
Here we go again with political opponents becoming enemies from within. As the rhetoric has become more violent against those we disagree with on policy, so have the threats from those who listen to this call to violence and to act.
Matthew Parker CEO, ISA
As we have mentioned previously in other articles, when you combine trigger points such as politics and race you’re also going to see an even more violent and dedicated group prepared to use violence. This is best demonstrated in the study by the fact that within the anti-government group, 23% also involved racist or extremist views as well.
The study uses the April 2019 case of a pro-second amendment Florida resident afraid of guns being confiscated, so he targeted with threats Representatives Eric Swalwell, Cory Booker, and Rashida Tlaib, with openly anti-Black and Islamophobic racism and anti-government sentiments. It should be noted, that none of them are from Florida.
The study further noted that 19% of the “ideologically motivated threats” to public officials were solely classified as race-based, and those with single issue-specific triggers such as animal rights and the environment at 6% and 9% respectively.
Paul Pelosi
There is no better demonstration of Emotional Decision-making = Ideological Grievances than the October 28, 2022, attack on Paul Pelosi, the husband of the 52nd Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, by a far-right conspiracy theorist David DePape who beat Mr. Pelosi with a hammer during the home invasion.
At age 42, Mr. DePape had a history of mental health issues and drug abuse which undoubtedly affected his cognitive abilities and intellectual thought process.
His trigger for the attack was believed to be politics, because he had embraced various far-right conspiracy theories, including Donald Trump’s claims of a stolen election in 2020.
It was also discovered that before the attack he had made online posts that were conspiratorial, racist, sexist, and antisemitic in nature and pushed COVID-19 vaccine misinformation.
During questioning and at trial he said he “planned to take Speaker Pelosi hostage and interrogate her.” testifying that he was “motivated by conspiracy theories” and had a “grand plan” to target Speaker Pelosi and others.
The Threat Math
When you add to the equation religious belief systems or other factors, this anger directed toward a perceived enemy can become emotionally and intellectually justified by a feeling that this fight or act is a “moral imperative.”
This is often demonstrated by those who have turned to violence against others who disagree with them over abortion and LGBTQ rights. People who are Pro-Life setting fires to clinics and taking the lives of doctors and staff.
People whose religious faith is anti-same-sex marriage go and physically attack those who are gay and vandalize churches, government buildings, and the homes of those who disagree with them.
The Quote: Part two
“Unfortunately, in the short term, we expect these trends to worsen as we move closer to the November election and especially in the aftermath, which we expect to be a volatile period.
We have already seen negative and often violent rhetoric in the run-up to the November elections being used by both political parties, the media, and extremists on both sides. We see on social media and hear from talking heads calls for their followers to “fight” if they want to win. They must beat the enemies of this country or it will be destroyed.
And more and more they call out individuals who are those enemies. Election workers who will steal the vote, health workers who push highly experimental vaccines, school officials who push “woke agendas” and their political opponents whose policies will destroy our economy, weaken of military, kill our seniors and children, and take our rights and liberties.
Prediction
This rhetoric only further emboldens those ready to use violence and helps to justify their actions. But if you look at 2016 and 2020 much of the violence peaks after the elections. After the counting of votes and the results and published.
It will be the same in 2024, and we expect the weeks and months after the election to see an increase in violence directed at local and state officials.
Brennan Center for Justice study
In April 2023 a Brennan Center for Justice study found that 75 percent of the public officials they surveyed felt threats “have increased in recent years”, with one-third reporting they had personally “experienced abuse, harassment, or threats related to their role as a public official.” This would seem to validate the findings in the CTC report as well as the data collected by other agencies and departments.
In the research report Intimidation of State and Local Office holders, the Threat to Democracy released January 25, 2024, they begin the report with this
“The January 6 insurrection at the Capitol seemed to mark a new peak in extremist intimidation targeting public officials.”
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/intimidation-state-and-local-officeholdersBut if January 6th was a new peak why does the report go on to point out some of the same things we have been writing about since 2012, that there has been little attention to the threats made to local and state officials?
Matthew Parker, ISA
The Brennan report also mentions a series of national surveys completed in October 2023; One of state legislators, and four of local officials. The authors base their findings and recommendations on the three dozen interviews with 1,700 officials. These officials were selected from every state, and balanced across party affiliations and other key demographics such as gender and religion.
The numbers again verify the growing threat the ISA Defending Democracy Initiative has warned law enforcement and public officials about since 2017.
43% of state legislators and 18% percent of local officeholders have experienced threats. With 40% percent of state legislators experiencing those threats or attacks just within the past three years of the report. More than 18% of local officials reported threats or attacks within the past year and a half. With 38% of state legislators reporting that the number of threats has increased over the last few years. This is serious enough but 29% of state legislators reported that the seriousness of the incidents has increased, and 89% of state legislators and 52% of local officials report incidents like stalking.
More Recent
Bridging Divides Initiative
The Bridging Divides Initiative https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/ describes itself as a “non-partisan research initiative that tracks and mitigates political violence in the United States” and they report in their article “Threats and Harassment Against Local Officials Spiked in July, New Data Shows”, released August 22, 2024, that threats to public officials have “more than doubled nationwide following the Trump rally shooting in Pennsylvania”.
This article echoes the information the Dept of Homeland Security released to law enforcement in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. In the DHS notice it also reports an uptick in threats to public officials and notes the shooting attempt on the former president as a trigger point.
The Bridging Divides Initiative Understanding Threats and Harassment Against Local Officials (UTH) project
Supported by the Brennan Center for Justice, the Anti-Defamation League, and Stand Together Trust. https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/UnderstandingThreats
The BDI researchers reported threats and harassment against local officials “increased significantly in the second half of the year” for 2024. And like our findings and experience the BDI found these threats directed towards city council members, school board members, poll workers, mayors, and local prosecutors.
As of the writing of this article, the BDI reports over 320 “threat and harassment events” reported in 40 states and the District of Columbia. These numbers show a 30% increase over the first seven months of 2023 and an increase of 87% from the same time in 2022.
Again, this was no surprise, but if true, where is the federal and state funding to mitigate these threats?
The BDI in their report verifies what we, the CTC, and other agencies have said repeatedly, threats will increase in number, increase in violence, and that local “elected or appointed government officials and judicial officials” are most likely to face these threats.
Apathy vs. Facts
In the CTC report, they confirm what we at ISA and the DDI have been saying for several years. “Threats against public officials have increased steadily since 2017.” Currently, 43% of public officials are under threat with 41% of those being elected/election officials and judges.
But just a reminder they also found in 2021 that some still believed that these “threats as a ‘nuisance’ primarily initiated by individuals ‘blowing off steam,” How is this even possible with the body of evidence that these threats are real?
Now contrast that “nuisance” argument with the 2023 Brennan Center for Justice report that found 75% of officials feel that threats have increased in recent years, with one-third experiencing threats themselves.
Cause and Effect
The CTC report, the Brennan Center for Justice, the Justice Department, and the ISA DDI all believe that our political discourse and society in general have become more polarized following the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections.
It’s easy to see and track the trends in social media, and the increased levels of violent rhetoric by political pundits, candidates, and public officials seem to validate the findings in the CTC report that speculates the increased number of threats are a result of “a growing tolerance for violence among Americans,” or to put it another way, we have gotten used to violence in our political discourse.
Recommendations and Solutions
The ISA Defending Democracy Initiative has been adamant that additional funding must be made available to deal with the increased threats at the local and state levels. Congress did pass legislation allowing some funding for physical security improvements to an office or home like cameras and alarms, and additional funding for personal security, unfortunately, republicans weakened the language of the rules to allow anyone to provide that protective security.
No requirements for training or experience, and no real oversite. You can read more about these regulations at https://www.eptraining.us/defending-democracy-executive-protection-for-elected-officials/blog/
But now what? We know threats are up, the July shooting of the former president increased threats at the state and local levels and no funding is available to help protect those public officials.
Well, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law published Intimidation of State and Local Officeholders, The Threat to Democracy has a set of recommendations,
- States should systematize security and safety practices to protect both officeholders and the public.
- States should systematically monitor threats against officeholders, taking care not to impinge on civil liberties.
- States should provide adequate physical security resources and training for officeholders.
Ok, great suggestions, but with what money, based on what standards, and with what resources?
- States should regulate open and concealed carry of guns in places where officeholders engage with the public.
- States should permit candidates and officeholders to restrict guns at town halls, campaign rallies, and other public events.
Seriously? Ok, first you’re going to set off your 2nd amendment pro-gun lobby and extremists who will then show up with guns to protest your new rules.
And, have we forgotten such authority to ban guns is already given to private property holders who can restrict access and ban guns on their land or facilities? So how about we recommend these events be conducted on private property with those rules in place?
6. States should update campaign finance laws to permit candidates and their parties to spend on legitimate security measures.
Right, um, can you please clarify what a “legitimate security measure” is, please? I guess you could mirror what was approved by Congress for members of Congress.
So, the recommendations by the Brennan Center seem a bit difficult to implement. But no fear, The Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) 17 February 2022 publication Protection Considerations for Violent Extremist Threats to Public Officials has solutions. Now remember the JCAT is a collaboration by the NCTC, DHS, and FBI.
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/126s_-_Protection_Considerations_for_Violent_Extremist_Threats_to_Public_Officials.pdf
Good Vibes
The publication opens positively enough with “the increase in threats targeting federal, state and local public officials—particularly in public gatherings— highlights unique protection, security, and public safety challenges.” So they get it.
And, thankfully it notes in the background section of the publication that “Over the last five years, there has been an uptick in threats to public officials—to include those at the state and local level to a degree unseen in the past—showcasing the need for first responder awareness, particularly during community-focused special or political events.”
So, this multi-agency Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) with all its expertise recommends the following “Best practices for responding to potential threats against public officials”:
- Monitor international, national, state, and local threat intelligence.
- Track international, national, state, or local issues that may serve as a pretext for violence during lawful demonstrations.
- Review open-source information before public engagements, paying particular attention to potential threats.
- Communicate any expectation of violence with interagency stakeholders, as well as the closest state or major urban area fusion center and Joint Terrorism Task Force.
- Encourage reporting of suspicious activity and threatening communications to law enforcement.
Ok, these sound recommendations are already in use by law enforcement and the private sector, though security classifications and access to LE material do limit the private sector to intelligence. So, for those public officials with private security, how are they getting the information they need to keep threat assessments up to date?
- Before a public engagement, conduct background research to become familiar with the public officials and their particular responsibilities in your area of responsibility.
- Identify medical care facilities to facilitate the safe and prompt transportation of public officials or their staff, should a medical issue present itself.
- Conduct site surveys of public engagement locations, paying attention to ingress and egress points for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
All three of these recommendations fall under executive protection advance work. This is done now by EP / LE teams as standard procedures. It was a failure in these procedures that led to the security failures in Butler PA on July 13th, 2024, and the shooting of the former President.
80% of a protective operations success is the advance work. Here state and local Law enforcement with protective responsibilities must receive standardized, accredited training and in-service training at least quarterly.
Recommendations continued;
- Conduct routine training and practical exercises with public officials, public safety personnel, and other security partners to test security measures.
Great, with what money, manpower, time, and resources? The ISA DDI will assist with training, and conducting exercises, but you need “buy-in” from state and local LE and the time and money to conduct these events.
So now they recommend some new behaviors or procedures;
Since the threats may attempt to monitor these public officials, and their families to find patterns. They recommend that “Public officials and their families should assess their online presence and any exposure to reduce the risk of a targeted attack.”
- Someone should “Educate public officials and their staff” on personal security measures, such as “changing routines and using caution when entering or leaving particular areas, especially when alone.”
This is a primary responsibility of the protective detail and the threat assessment process. We look for these patterns and try to mitigate risks by using different travel means and routes, changing schedules so they are not as predictable, and using deception tactics like body doubles and multiple cars.
We are all for the official and their family being aware of their surroundings, but it’s a bit of a stretch to expect them to use different routes and varying schedules. Especially when kids are involved with extracurriculars like sports, which start and end on a fixed schedule.
- Encourage public officials to maintain close communication with law enforcement and security officials, and establish a point of contact for protection needs.
- Inform public officials how to report suspicious activity and threatening communications.
Good common-sense measures.
- Encourage public officials, as well as their family and friends, to use safe practices online to mitigate the risk of doxing or swatting. For example, limiting the disclosure of details (location and time) of public engagements.
- Educate officials, family, and friends about safe habits and the importance of discretion when posting information online.
I’m sorry but you do realize most public officials are required under transparency laws to publish their public schedules of events, right?
You understand they encourage people to attend these events and it is how they stay in office, by getting voters to attend meetings and communicating directly with the voters.
Yes, keep personal information personal, and don’t share unofficial events with the public, but you need to assign someone with security experience to monitor what you post and have some input to what goes and what doesn’t go in social media.
** Now what is missing from both sets of recommendations by the Brennan Center and The Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT)?
Assign a protective detail to public officials
Use vehicles, procedures, and tactics that protect the official from a direct act of violence.
Train state and local law enforcement in executive and close protection skills
I see money for “legitimate security measures” but is that to reimburse law enforcement or pay for security from the private sector?
If you hire the private sector for public officials, how do they interact with law enforcement and government agencies and departments? What is their authority, and access to LE intelligence, who do they report to?
Summary
We have written on the topic of protecting public officials for a few years now and occasionally you would see an article in the media or a government study that seemed to agree with what we were saying. Often we would quote that article or study and renew our call for funding, training, or a more serious approach to protecting local public officials.
But with the three sources and their reports or studies we have highlighted in this article today, can there be any doubt of the serious threats to our public officials or our democratic process in general? We will see a growing exodus of people no longer willing to serve in elected office, election volunteers will stop serving their communities, and as we have mentioned previously, elected officials refusing to take on hard issues or vote for legislation over threats to themselves and their families.
If you look at the recommendations we reviewed there is a glaring lack of any mention of a protective detail. So unless we demand protecting public officials with the funding and training required to do it correctly, expect this situation to continue to get worse.
Since 2012 the Independent Security Advisors Executive Protection Training Academy has supported the goals of the Defending Democracy initiative by supporting state and local law enforcement with accredited executive protection training. There are public officials currently protected by law enforcement trained by our team. And we have prepared law enforcement to form close protective details so that in the event of an increased threat the agency or department can respond immediately and provide security to the official as required to mitigate the threat.
As we approach November and the election we call on law enforcement, public officials, and the departments and agencies involved to begin the process of training and preparing protective details in the event this election continues the trends of the last two. Elections officials will be targets, as will the lawyers, public officials, and volunteers involved in the democratic process of holding an election.
Sources and citations
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/rising-threats-to-public-officials-a-review-of-10-years-of-federal-data/
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/126s_-_Protection_Considerations_for_Violent_Extremist_Threats_to_Public_Officials.pdf
https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/UnderstandingThreats
https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/updates/2024/threats-and-harassment-against-local-officials-spiked-july-new-data-shows
https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/intimidation-state-and-local-officeholders
Steady Rise in Threats Against Public Officials while Confidence in Democracy Declines
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/local-officials-threats-harassment-data-rcna146063
https://www.npr.org/2023/08/12/1193463117/violent-threats-against-public-officials-are-rising-heres-why
https://www.axios.com/2022/11/01/princeton-threats-officials-elections-harassment
For previous ISA articles on the security and protection of public officials please visit https://www.eptraining.us/blog/
#executiveprotectiontraining, #defendingdemocracyinitiative @eptraining.us
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